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There are many controversial and differing opinions concerning ye’s concept of soft power 
which have lead to some confusion in our understanding of what soft power actually is. By 
analyzing a given governmental agency, i.e. China’s Confucius Institute, I will show the problem 
inherent in ye’s term soft power. I will analyze the concept of soft power as a combination of 
two meanings: ‘soft’ and ‘power’. I believe this research could offer a new perspective on the 
concept of soft power and could provide a theoretical scale for measuring different countries’ 
foreign policies labeled as soft power. 
 




















There are many controversial and differing opinions concerning Nye’s concept of soft power. 
This diversity of opinion has led to some confusion in our understanding of what soft power 
actually is. In this paper, I will analyze Nye’s concept of soft power and suggest dividing the 
concept of soft power into two distinct parts. To explain this different way of understanding the 
idea of soft power, I will discuss a specific government agency, that of China’s Confucius 
Institute, which clearly enunciates its goal as soft power. 
 
The Chinese government has repeatedly stated that the Confucius Institute was established for 
the purpose of furthering China’s soft power. But experts who study Chinese foreign policy, 
such as Ingrid d’Hooghe (2007) & YiWei Wang (2008), criticize that it is not soft power but 
purely and simply propaganda. From these different points of view, I would like to look at what 
soft power is and discuss its underlying meanings.  
 
 
What is soft power? 
 
The term soft power was first put forward in 1990 by the neo-liberalist Joseph S. Nye, a 
researcher of interdependency in international relations (Robert Jackson, Georg Sørensen 2003: 
49). In his study, Nye emphasized the importance of soft power used in contrast to the concept 
of hard power, which includes a country’s economic and military power usually cited in 
traditional power politics. Nye defined soft power as a country’s power promoted by a country’s 
political values and cultural attraction. He pointed out that soft power was more important than 
hard power in the present post cold-war era. In this manner, he proposed three elements as 
sources of soft power which he considered sources of new diplomacy in this century, that is, a 
country’s culture, political values and its foreign policies (Nye 2004: 11). Among these three 
sources, the most fascinating one is a country’s culture. This source has not previously been 
considered as a serious factor in international relations. In Nye’s definition there are at least two 
salient points. The first is that he treats soft power within the usual power concept. The other is 
that he illuminates culture as a new source of power. 
 
Even though Nye (2004: 18-21) explained soft power as a power, his understanding of the 
concept is quite different from that usually taken in the traditional understanding of the term. 
His concepts of power and soft power go beyond what people usually describe as power, and he 
emphasized the importance of such an extended area of power; such as power through a 
country’s culture and power through a country’s reputation. From this point of view, the concept 
  
of power moves towards an abstruse area of culture and it becomes more important to define 
what culture is. Briefly, Nye’s soft power is not only a concept based on traditional power but 
also a new concept including a country’s interest obtained by the performance of cultural 
exchange. Nye also agreed to this point of view in his recent book, The Powers to Lead (2008: 
63-84). Admitting the ability of authoritarian power to lead, Nye stresses other means as well, 
for instance the power obtained by a country’s reputation, its admiration by others, and so on.  
 
Conceptual ambiguity in soft power 
 
Ever since the concept of soft power was first introduced it has generated much controversy. 
Similarly to the idea of ‘the clash of civilizations’ by Samuel P. Huntington (1996) which was 
criticized in its essential concept of culture, many researchers have pointed out Nye’s 
problematic understanding of culture and culture for a country’s own interest.  
 
Concerning the basic concept of culture, Janice B. Mattern (2005), for example, made the 
problem regarding soft power quite clear with the phrase that a country’s attraction and a 
country’s culture are not natural but constructed. Yasushi Watanabe (2008: 184-192) also 
doubted what Nye supposed a country’s original culture was. Questions arose as to the relation 
between culture and soft power because Nye’s concept of soft power is closely related to the 
concept of culture. Needless to say, this is because Nye himself proposed culture as a source of 
power (2004: 44-55).  
 
In order to understand the relation between culture and soft power, I will refer to the concise 
concepts of culture as determined by Julie Reeves. In her work, Reeves (2004: 1-4) analyzed the 
concept of culture in international relations as comprising two separate parts; these are the 
‘humanist idea of culture’ and the ‘anthropological idea of culture’. To summarize her ideas, the 
‘humanist idea of culture’ is the concept of a humanist who thinks human beings have a 
manifest consciousness and acknowledge their own culture. This concept is related to the 
colonialist concept of culture which emphasizes ‘nation’ and ‘national identity’ (Reeves 2004: 
20-22). The ‘anthropological idea of culture’ on the other hand, is understood as comprising a 
certain space where people and customs are mixed and can mingle. No one can recognize his or 
her clear consciousness or his or her own culture (Reeves 2004: 19)1. These two concepts of 
culture show why the concept of culture is so important in an exact understanding of soft power. 
                                                   
1 This anthropological idea of culture is related to the concept of hegemony defined by A. Gramsci. The point is that 
hegemony is the ruling value system existing in people’s practice and their own experiences. Briefly, hegemony 
exists not only in small spaces of political areas, but also in larger spaces anywhere people live. In hegemonic space, 
people cannot simply maintain what is true or false because hegemony is too changeable in every situation. For 
further information, refer to the articles of Q. Hoare and G. Nowell-Smith (1971). Selections from the Prison 
otebooks of Antonio Gramsci. London: Lawrence and Wishart. 
  
When soft power follows a ‘humanist idea of culture’, it could be interpreted as culture for a 
given country. Soft power does admit an ‘anthropological idea of culture’; however, it is 
difficult to define the origin of a given country’s culture. Based on Reeves’ different concepts of 
culture, it is easy to understand why Mattern and Watanabe doubted the concept of culture that 
Nye used in his definition of the concept of soft power.  
 
Concerning a country’s interest as a goal of soft power, Ferguson Niall (2003) criticized that soft 
power is ‘too soft’ to obtain a country’s interest. Takeshi Matsuda (2007: 5-7) further tried to 
find soft power in bilateral cultural exchange and not in unilateral cultural imperialism. Niall 
estimated soft power was not more effective than hard power, whereas Matsuda cautioned 
against strong coercion by cultural means when it is used as a representation of a country. These 
two different opinions arise from the way in which researchers believe culture can or cannot be 
effective. Furthermore, this difference of opinion underscores the differing views of 
policy-makers as to what soft power must be. 
 
Even though the concept of culture itself has such different meanings and though there are 
various opinions on how to comprehend the power of culture, the most problematic point is that 
such a concept of culture has started to go hand in hand with the concept of soft power. That is 
to say, some overly hasty researchers have started to accept the idea of soft power as another 
vital ruling strategy by means of cultural elements. For instance, the Chairman of the Advisory 
Group to the U.S. Congress, Edward P. Djerejian (2003) advised that the new U.S. diplomacy 
needs to spend more government budget on cultural programs, such as English teaching and 
exchange programs, to promote the national interest. However, Jan Melissen (2007), a professor 
of Antwerp University, criticized that U.S. recent cultural diplomacy was nothing more than 
propaganda for its own national interest2. The conceptual ambiguity of soft power accounts for 
the difference in estimation regarding U.S. diplomatic policies. In another instance, for example, 
Douglas McGray suggested the concept of ‘cool’ and proposed measuring the amount of 
national ‘cool’. ‘Cool’ refers to how much people of other countries feel attracted towards a 
given country3. Just as GNP (Gross National Product) is commonly recognized, McGray 
proposed an imitation which would become acknowledged as his brainchild, the concept of 
GNC (Gross National Cool). His work is very impressive and what is most interesting is that his 
new idea has a deep connection with GNP. Namely, his concept of GNC can be understood as a 
numerical index of cultural contents business, which is the subordinate sector in a country’s 
whole economic activity, described by Nye as hard power. But even in this case Watanabe & 
McConnell (2008) advocated Nye’s concept of soft power. They believe that the concept of soft 
                                                   
2 Melissen described U.S. recent public diplomacy as ‘old wine in new bottles’ compared to the old strategy, i.e. 
propaganda (2007: 3). 
3 For further information see <www.douglasmcgray.com/grossnationalcool.pdf> 
  
power was not introduced to be used merely for a given country’s interests and that it does not 
ignore the idea of structured culture at all. They stated positively that these understandings come 
from the researchers themselves misconstruing Nye’s concept of soft power and try to adhere to 
Nye’s original concept of soft power. In the same context, another researcher, Koichi Iwabuchi 
(2007: 77) insisted that the concept of soft power has also been greatly changed from Nye’s 
original idea. He continues by affirming that the changed concept of soft power focuses only on 
a given country’s interests, and that culture is consumed for a given country’s interests. From 
the same viewpoint, Shigemitsu Konno (2008: 1-3) also agreed that the concept of soft power 
has been used by taking certain points out of context and thereby changing the meaning as a 
whole. 
 
However, the aim of my research is not to demonstrate if there are misunderstandings or not 
among researchers, nor is it to examine whether the concept of soft power is good or not. I 
intend to show that there is an inherent ambiguity in Nye’s definition of soft power. As I 
mentioned above, in one aspect Nye himself limited the usage of culture only for a country’s 
interest, nevertheless in another he strongly remarked on the importance of non-state actors 
(Joseph Nye 2004: 90-92). To illustrate this, I will take the example of Japan’s soft power as 
commented by Nye.  
 
Nye emphasized the potential of Japanese soft power through Japanese high and popular culture, 
on the other hand he treated the Japanese language lightly for its lesser practical use, though 
language might be thought of as the ground from which ‘Japanese’ high and popular culture 
springs. Briefly, Nye’s concept of soft power is flexible and allows for too much emphasis on 
cultural business which has a direct bearing on a country’s financial interests. These problematic 
parts of Nye’s soft power have led others to misunderstand his concept. In other words, Nye’s 
concept of soft power is not clearly separated from the concept of hard power. His epochal 
attempt to build a new power framework sealed itself by a desire to compromise with an 
obsolete concept of power. Such base defects led to an imprecise understanding of soft power, 
sometimes as an overly-soft strategy, sometimes as propaganda. Figure 1 shows that Nye’s 
original concept of soft power is divided into two parts. The part shown by a different color 
describes the gray area caused by different understandings of culture and misunderstandings 
regarding soft power.  
 
In particular, the gray area makes soft power difficult to identify in respect of the following two 
points: on which concept of culture it is based; and what is its goal. This gray area is interpreted 




Fig.1: Changed concept of power caused by different understandings of soft power 
       
 
 
The Confucius Institute as a case of ambiguity in soft power 
 
To explain this ambiguity in Nye’s concept of soft power, I will take the example of a certain 
agency which enunciates its role as its country’s tool of soft power. The case is China’s 
Confucius Institute which was established in 2004, supposedly in order to popularize the 
Chinese language worldwide. An American journalist, Joshua Kurlantzick (2007: 81-94), who 
analyzed China’s soft power pointed out that the Chinese government works hard to promote its 
cultural influence in the world. He also described China’s Confucius Institute as a tool for 
promoting China’s soft power. Above all, the Chinese government has declared that its cultural 
work, such as through the Confucius Institute, is to promote China’s soft power (Multilateral 
Forum for Cultural Relations 20064; Yugang Chen 2007: 193-204). Though I take China’s 
Confucius Institute as an example here, similar case studies analyzed by other researchers can 
also be referred to. For instance, the British Council analyzed by James M. Mitchell (1990), the 
Goethe Institute by Ulrich Ammon (1991), the American Center by Yasushi Watanabe (2008), 
and so forth. Each research study had its own methodological approach; however, all the studies 
had the same aim: to establish the goal of each institute examined. Regardless of official 
announcements that the Confucius Institute works for mutual understanding5, I also needed to 
establish its fundamental goals and aims, and in the results of my research I could identify two 
characteristic features, as described below. 
 
                                                   
4 ‘Multilateral forum for cultural relations 2006’ (2006.8.31), held in Beijing, sponsored by The Foreign Ministry of 
China. 
5 Foreign Chinese Language Education Promotion Team <www.hanban.edu.cn/> 
  
Confucius Institute for political effect 
 
I could establish that the implantation of Confucius Institutes is deeply related to those 
geographical regions considered important by the Chinese government from a political point of 
view. For example, a number of Confucius Institutes are found in the regional area near China, 
such as Japan, Thailand, and South Korea. Others are found in larger polities, such as the EU 
and the US. Over 60% of the 165 Confucius Institutes are concentrated in these three areas. The 
implantation near China especially is not so strange when understood as the Chinese 
Civilization group, which Samuel P. Huntington (1996: 254-258, 346-349) had precisely 
anticipated in his book. See Table 1 below. 
 
Table 1. Confucius Institutes in the world 
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It is particularly worth paying attention to the rapid implantation in Africa. After the Beijing 
Summit of China-Africa Cooperation in 2006, Confucius Institutes in Africa dramatically 
increased from zero to ten in only six months6. The main goal of ‘The Beijing Summit of 
China-Africa Cooperation’ was to exploit the natural resources of Africa by Chinese 
                                                   
6 The Beijing Summit of Forum on China-Africa Cooperation adopted a declaration in the Chinese capital 
proclaiming establishment of ‘a new type of strategic partnership’ between China and Africa. The partnership 
features ‘political equality and mutual trust, economic win-win cooperation and cultural exchanges’ according to 
the declaration, which was adopted by leaders of China and 48 African countries at the end of the two-day 
gathering. The Chinese government proposed that China and Africa should fully tap cooperation potential and 
strive to bring their trade volume to 100 billion U.S. dollars by 2010. The figure will be more than double the 2005 
level, about 39.7 billion U.S. dollars. For further information see: 
<english.focacsummit.org/2006-11/05/content_5166.htm> 
  
government finance under the name of ODA (Official Development Assistance) (Shinichi 
Mizuta 2008). Concerning this foreign strategy of China, Jean-Christophe Servant (2005) 
criticized it as ‘new colonialism’. By this, Servant meant that such China-Africa networks do 
not work for mutual economic benefit but rather for the strongest country in the trading system. 
While the African countries supply the natural resources, China utilizes them to manufacture 
industrial products and sells the manufactured products back to the African countries. This circle 
relationship causes another ‘North-South Divide’, another cycle which Servant defines as ‘new 
colonialism’. Moreover, the NHK broadcasting company also remarked on the fact that the goal 
of China’s cultural and economic investment in Africa is for China’s national interest. NHK paid 
particular attention to the construction of African infrastructures by China. It suspected the aim 
of such construction was to create new markets for selling Chinese products. 
 
 
Confucius Institute for economic effect 
 
According to a Chinese news article, the goals of the Confucius Institute are described as 
methods for increasing the demand of Chinese language and for developing Chinese cultural 
contents business. From some materials on the Confucius Institute, I could determine that the 
plan to establish Confucius Institutes was deeply associated with the development of the HSK 
Chinese proficiency test (Yuzhen Cheng 2005: 79-89). Language proficiency tests are generally 
accepted as a necessary tool for learning a language, regardless of the huge revenue they 
generate. But needless to say the American ETS7 language proficiency test is generally 
accepted as a big education business. Certain comments were made concerning the language 
business during the ‘Multilateral Forum for Cultural Relations 2006’. A foreign ministry 
ex-officer, participating in the forum, remarked on the improvement in the ‘cultural deficit’ 
indicating that China did have quite some deficit in its cultural business. To correct this cultural 
deficit, the official insisted on the importance of developing cultural contents worthy of sale 
towards the outside world. One of these items is the Chinese language (Minglang Zhou 2004: 
12-16). At the ‘2007 Confucius Institute Symposium’, the participants, including a government 
officer, frankly remarked that the English education business was the Institute’s business rival. 
 
Aside from comments concerning the language education business, it was also remarked that 
the Confucius Institute is used as a branch office for selling China’s cultural contents8. China’s 
cultural contents business particularly has a great advantage in promoting China’s soft power, 
which the Chinese government believes is even more than that of the U.S. This is due to its 
                                                   
7 Educational Testing Service (ETS) founded in 1974, American NPO. It developed the English test TOEFL, GRE 
etc., its revenues are estimated at $600 million a year. <www.ets.org/> 
8 Resources from interviews with officers of Confucius Institutes. 
  
incomparably huge population and market. Relying on these enormous domestic and overseas 
growing markets, China’s newborn business could stand on its own feet much faster than 
anyone expected. China did not need to waste its time and efforts in cultivating the market. The 
most effective task of the Chinese government in selling its cultural contents is to promote 
China’s national identity and to remind its people that China has its own honorable historical 
culture unique to China.  
 
To summarize the role of the Confucius Institute, it tends to use culture as an economic tool for 
raising income, and language as a political tool and symbol of China’s international relations. 
Although the Confucius institute labels its goal with the term soft power, it has great 
possibilities of working for China’s national interest based on the idea of its national identity 
and national culture. 
 
 
China’s understanding of soft power 
 
A senior researcher at the Clingendael in the Netherlands, Ingrid d’Hooghe (2007: 94-103), 
noted that the Chinese government itself officially stresses its national identity and the influence 
over other neighboring countries through the power of its own culture. Also YiWei Wang (2008: 
259-268) who studies Chinese foreign policy criticized this policy as propaganda. According to 
research by Quansheng Zhao (2007: 295-299), the goals of China’s foreign policy can be 
categorized as: ‘modernization’, ‘nationalism’, and ‘regionalism’. Zhao insists that the Chinese 
government needs to develop its economy in order to gain enough power to protect its own 
sovereignty, especially in its regional multilateralism, which entails multiple countries working 
together on a given agenda and which needs to organize group committees for resolving the 
given agendas. Gilbert Rozman also pointed out that China’s ‘regionalism’ is deeply connected 
to its multilateralism (Rozman 2007: 134-137). Particularly urgent regional issues, such as 
North Korea’s brinkmanship diplomacy in threatening to possess nuclear weapons, allow China 
to be the principal member of this regional group committee under so called multilateralism.  
 
China prefers multilateral situations in which it has the chance to be a top player in the region to 
unilateral situations which inevitably end in confrontation accompanied by military conflict. 
Such drastic turnabout in Chinese foreign policy is usually mentioned as dating from the 1979 
CCP (Chinese Communist Party) conference (Guoli Liu 2007: 5-7). In the late 1970s, Chinese 
leaders were afraid of China’s international isolation. They declared an ‘open-door policy’ and 
economic reform. At the same time they implemented a new diplomatic strategy, instead of 
wielding military force, towards its neighboring countries. In the same manner a Japanese 
  
researcher, Toshiaki Arai (2002: 29-47), also draws attention to the three ideas on which China 
put great importance from 1979 onwards, using the terms ‘country’s power’, ‘sovereignty’, and 
‘unity’. Moreover, he also uses these three keywords to describe China’s foreign policy. 
 
From the same viewpoint as Arai, Cheng-Chwee Kuik (2008: 109-112) explicitly states that in 
the idea of multilateralism the most important element that China would like to promote is 
economic power. According to him, in regional multilateralism, economic power is the only 
power which China needs to promote in order to grasp regional leadership, because the wielding 
of military force, on which China depended for a long time, is likely to break down China’s 
recent remarkable economic achievement (Cheng-Chwee Kuik 2008: 129-133). When it comes 
to China’s multilateralism from the viewpoint of China’s concept of power, it could be 
recognized that China has its own characteristic classification of power which falls into two 
categories. One is military power, which China adhered to for a long time, and the other is 
non-military power, which is praised as China’s diplomatic turnabout or China’s new 
diplomacy. 
 
As we can see, in the practical case of the Confucius Institute, China’s understanding of culture 
and language are closely connected to its concept of power. To put it simply, the Chinese 
government imagines soft power is auxiliary and is a substitute power-concept for traditional 
power based on the nation-state. In a recent ceremony for the 60th anniversary of China’s 
communist revolution, the Chinese government again emphasized its national identity and 
clearly announced that they support soft power. Figure 2 shows this viewpoint of China’s power 
and soft power. 
 






Following this logic, apart from wielding military force, all other means are acceptable as 
peaceful acts. Prohibiting military force is worth praising. But military force is not all violent. 
Figure 1 can also be explained by this logic. The middle-sized circle on the right side of Figure 
1, showing ‘cultural business, language education, etc. is what China understands as soft power. 
Perhaps some researchers are willing to argue that the reason for managing cultural business is 
its income. Of course, cultural business is important, even simply for the sake of maintaining 
cultural exchange, because the revenue from such business gives it the ability to sustain its work. 
But the most important point is to determine the main goals of such business. It is the 
propaganda aspect that most fear when culture is used only for a given country’s interest. Brook 
Larmer (2005) for instance, is concerned that China’s leaders have a strong tendency to regard 
even sports and sports players as tools to promote the country’s refined image. It is generally 
accepted that, to a certain degree, sports can represent a nation-state. However, this is not the 





Even if the Confucius Institute has these main goals of political and economic effect for the 
benefit of China, it covers these goals with the obscure mantle of soft power. Such ambiguity in 
soft power makes it difficult to perceive what these main goals are. Moreover, this ambiguity 
also provides a way to escape accountability (such as the Confucius Institute works only for its 
country) because Nye’s concept of soft power itself admits the function of soft power for a 
country’s interest. Though critics could not find any real harm here they do warn against 
inappropriate usage of the concept of soft power.  
 
With ambiguity existing within the term soft power itself, ambiguity is further increased by 
China’s own categorization of power: military power and other ‘peaceful’ powers. Moreover, 
Nye suggested fusing the two meanings; traditional power and a new concept of power based on 
a country’s attraction promoted by cultural exchange. However, I believe Nye’s concept of soft 
power just gives a broader working space for hard power. As we can see in the example of the 
Confucius Institute, the combination of ambiguity in the concept of soft power and a country’s 
own interpretation of the concept of power could give a definite direction to the understanding 






Therefore I would like to suggest a new framework for understanding soft power along the lines 
of a similar proposition put forward by Nancy Snow (2009: 3-10) with regards to ‘public 
diplomacy’. Nancy Snow grasped the point of separation between ‘public’ and ‘diplomacy’. She 
pointed out the conflict between ‘public’ and ‘diplomacy’ in the term ‘public diplomacy’ which 
is described as foreign policy which promotes soft power. I would like to adopt her suggestion 
in order to explain the term soft power properly. Firstly, when ‘soft’ is emphasized in the term 
soft power, i.e. SOFT power, it can be considered an effective tool for the realization of mutual 
understanding through activities such as intellectual exchange and cultural relations. Secondly, 
when ‘power’ is emphasized in the term, i.e. soft POWER, it is usually used only for a country’s 
interests. In this case, soft POWER can also imply a grasping political leadership over certain 
areas of activity, including the business of cultural contents such as movies, animations and so 
forth which contribute to the enhancement of a country’s financial ability and its refined image, 
and which is used as propaganda. 
 






In the beginning of this paper I discussed the different understandings of the term soft power. 
Then, I took an example of China’s Confucius Institute to explain these different understandings 
of soft power. It appeared that the Confucius Institute, while declaring its goal as soft power, 
mainly works for its own country, China. I analyzed this conceptual gap in soft power resulting 
from different understandings of culture. Compounding this conceptual ambiguity contained in 
soft power with a country’s own interpretation of the concept of power, the understanding of 
soft power is also affected. Even if a given country declares its goal simply as soft power, it is 
necessary to determine which concept of culture and power the country’s policy is based on. 
Finally, in order to settle this problematic situation, I have suggested a new framework which 
  
shows a division of the concept of soft power: SOFT power and soft POWER. Using this 
framework we can judge the intentions of a given country’s foreign policies simply labeled as 
soft power. Especially when ‘power’ is emphasized, as in the term soft POWER, we can see that 
such policies are not really aimed at mutual understanding. I believe this research could provide 
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